Why some countries adopt ecolabeling schemes in their regulatory arsenal and others do not? by Gilles Grolleau & Sana El Harbi
Why some countries adopt ecolabeling schemes in their
regulatory arsenal and others do not? 
Gilles Grolleau Sana El Harbi
Montpellier SupAgro and LAMETA UMR 1135 Université de Sousse
Abstract
We use data to investigate econometrically the determinants of the adoption of ecolabeling
schemes among countries. Our findings show that economic and political freedoms,
innovation capacities and experience with other environmental voluntary approaches play a
major, sometimes counter-intuitive, role to explain the diffusion of governmental ecolabeling
programs.
The authors wish to thank Naoufel Mzoughi for stimulating comments.
Citation: Grolleau, Gilles and Sana El Harbi, (2008) "Why some countries adopt ecolabeling schemes in their regulatory
arsenal and others do not?." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 17, No. 3 pp. 1-11
Submitted: November 2, 2007.  Accepted: January 14, 2008.
URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume17/EB-07Q20029A.pdf1 
  1. Introduction 
During the last two decades, policymakers turned their attention to information based policies 
in response to dysfunctional markets. According to the Coase Theorem, socially optimal risk 
sharing  can be  obtained  if  all  stakeholders  can  negotiate  at  a  very  low  cost.  Information 
asymmetries  constitute  an  impediment  to  such  private  bargaining.  Removing  or  at  least 
attenuating  such  information  asymmetries  may  enable  to  reach  a  Pareto optimal  outcome 
(Tietenberg, 1998; Case, 2001).  In line with economists' arguments “preaching” the  good 
impact of information provision, several governments have implemented ecolabeling schemes 
in their regulatory arsenal. By making information publicly available, consumers can make 
informed decisions and choose products in accordance with their preferences. The potential 
for such an increasing role for disclosure strategies is reinforced by the continual decrease of 
the cost of information collection, aggregation and dissemination
1.   
  
In 1977, Germany introduced the first national and multiproduct ecolabel, i.e., the Blue Angel 
label. A decade later, several countries (e.g., Nordic countries, Canada, Japan) developed their 
own  ecolabeling  programs.  Ecolabeling  schemes  are  now  present  in  almost  all  OECD 
countries, and in some transitional economies (Kern et al., 2001). There are more than 40 
ecolabeling schemes worldwide with a very unequal diffusion among countries. Nevertheless, 
the determinants of the unequal diffusion of ecolabeling schemes remain unexplored. The aim 
of this contribution is to fill this gap by investigating why some countries adopt ecolabeling 
schemes  in  their  regulatory  arsenal  while  others  do  not.  We  use  survey  data  to  test 
econometrically whether a set of ad hoc factors may explain these trends about ecolabeling 
schemes.  Because  of  data  limitations,  the  ecolabeling  schemes  studied  here  combine  two 
features: they are governmental or quasi governmental schemes at a national or supranational 
level  and  are  also  multiproduct  schemes.  Concretely,  this  delineation  excludes  schemes 
devoted to one product category (e.g., dolphin friendly ecolabel) or private schemes (e.g., the 
FSC ecolabel on wood products). 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section uses economic literature 
to  formulate  some  hypotheses  on  the  determinants  of  the  diffusion  and  development  of 
ecolabeling schemes. The third section presents the data, the econometric methods used, and 
discusses the results. The fourth section concludes and suggests possible extensions.  
 
2. Related literature and hypotheses 
The existing literature on the diffusion of innovations is mainly devoted to private entities 
motivated by profit objectives (Rogers, 1995). A first branch of this literature considers that 
the diffusion of an innovation is primarily driven by its profitability. Rational agents select 
within the choice set, the most profitable alternative (Davies, 1979). Without neglecting the 
significant role of profitability, another branch considers that diffusion results from social 
pressures pushing agents toward an organisational convergence or isomorphism (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). Some contributions suggest that these two perspectives are not mutually 
exclusive  and  can  contribute  to  a  better  understanding  of  the  diffusion  of  organisational 
innovations  (Mansfield,  1995;  Hislop  et  al.,  1997).  Moreover,  other  studies  show  the 
significant impact of certain macro economic variables such as GDP per capita (Lucke, 1993; 
Neumayer and Perkins, 2005).  We formulated several hypotheses, inspired by the related 
literature on the diffusion of (eco)organizational innovations at the firm and country levels.  
 
                                                 
1 The interested reader can take a look at the following website http://www.greenerchoices.org/eco labels/eco 
home.cfm (visited 23 October 2007), where a wide range of private and public ecolabeling schemes are detailed 
and analysed by a consumer union. 2 
   
First, according to the so called environmental Kuznet curves, beyond a certain point, the 
richer a country is, the more likely it is to be environmentally concerned. Indeed, once basic 
needs  are  satisfied,  people  are  more  likely  to  devote  attention  to  environmental  issues. 
Consequently, by considering that ecolabeling schemes reflect a higher degree of concern for 
environmental  issues,  we  hypothesize  that  richer  countries  are  more  likely  to  adopt  an 
ecolabeling scheme, ceteris paribus (H1). 
 
Second, standard economic theories predict that country size can affect policy choice and 
design. Small domestic markets can be disadvantaged because of (dis)economies of scale and 
because learning curves in production of public and private goods, which play an important 
role  in  differentiated  product  markets,  cannot  be  exploited.  Moreover,  larger  domestic 
markets raise the intensity of product market competition which results in beneficial pro 
competitive  effects  (Alesina  et  al.,  2005).  Subsequently,  we  hypothesise  that  large  sized 
economies are more likely to adopt an ecolabeling scheme, ceteris paribus (H2). 
 
Third,  since  Adam  Smith  (1776  [1976]),  economic  theory  emphasizes  the  necessity  of 
protecting the freedom of individuals that results in greater prosperity for the whole society. 
In the same vein, some authors argue that countries with high levels of economic freedom will 
prefer  instruments  that  allow  individuals  to  make  informed  choices  rather  than  political 
control of environmental decision making (Stroup, 2004). As indicated earlier, the conceptual 
economic  foundation  for  ecolabeling  strategies  is  the  Coase  Theorem  which  asserts  that 
bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome if symmetric information is available at a low 
cost. Thus, more efficient governments are more likely to support and promote market based 
instruments rather than more intrusive instruments, such as command and control standards 
(Buchanan and Tullock, 1975). Moreover, inefficient and corrupted governments discourage 
private sector from any voluntary environmental initiatives, making ecolabeling schemes less 
interesting for these countries. Therefore, we hypothesize that the probability of adopting an 
ecolabeling scheme increases with the degree of economic freedom in an economy, ceteris 
paribus  (H3). 
 
Fourth, open economies are more likely to face environmental demands from export markets. 
Ecolabeling can be used either as a signalling device or as a screening mechanism about 
unobservable environmental attributes (Spence, 1973). Given that environmental attributes 
can be used as barriers to trade, exporting countries are more likely to develop ecolabeling 
schemes  (Kern  et  al.,  2001).  So,  we  hypothesize  that  the  probability  of  adopting  an 
ecolabeling scheme increases with the degree of openness of an economy, ceteris paribus 
(H4). 
 
Fifth,  because  ecolabeling  schemes  are  based  on  the  periodical  raise  of  environmental 
standards, countries that possess technological innovation capacities are more likely to be 
interested  in  ecolabeling  schemes.  Moreover,  innovation  capacities  are  likely  to  allow 
increased profits and environmental improvements (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). In turn, 
high technological innovation capacities can also promote innovation in the choice of policy 
instruments. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: The probability of adopting 
an  ecolabeling  scheme  increases  for  countries  having  higher  technological  innovation 
capacities, ceteris paribus (H5). 
 
Sixth,  previous  experience  with  environmental  and/or  organizational  innovations  may 
facilitate the adoption of more recent innovations, notably because of learning by doing and  3 
   
economies of scale (Delmas, 2003; King and Lenox, 2001). Accordingly, the acquisition of 
specific  competences  and  skills  (e.g.,  standard  setting,  certification  and  accreditation 
procedures)  are  likely  to  reduce  the  cost  of  designing  and  implementing  an  ecolabeling 
scheme. Therefore we formulate the following hypothesis: The probability of adopting an 
ecolabeling  programme  increases  with  a  society  past  experience  with  (eco)organisational 
innovations, ceteris paribus (H6). 
 
Seventh, it is intuitively convincing that countries that exhibit high concern levels regarding 
environmental issues are more likely to adopt ecolabeling schemes. Indeed, such programs 
can  help  people  to  express  their  environmentally  friendly  preferences  through  their 
consumption  choices  and provide  incentives  to  manufacturers  to produce  environmentally 
friendly products. For the Blue Angel, “this early innovation can be explained, on the one 
hand,  by  a  high  awareness  among  German  consumers  regarding  the  environmental 
characteristics of a product. On the other hand, this environmental policy innovation was the 
result of campaigns by consumer organizations for more regulative instruments to prevent the 
negative impacts of specific products on health and environment” (Kern et al., 2001, p. 2). As 
a consequence, we hypothesize that the probability of adopting an ecolabeling programme 
increases with the society involvement in environmental issues, ceteris paribus (H7). 
 
Eighth,  by  giving  all  citizens  an  influence  over  government,  including  the  design  of 
environmental  policy  (Grolleau  et  al.  2004),  increased  political  freedom  and  reduced 
corruption are expected to improve the environmental outcome because of political leaders 
being held politically accountable for their actions. Indeed, a well functioning democratic 
system  can  provide  adequate  incentives  in  favour  of  environmental  quality.  The  positive 
influence of more democratic systems on  environmental quality is documented in several 
contributions  (Congleton,  1992;  Magnani,  2000).  Therefore,  we  hypothesize  that  the 
probability of adopting an ecolabeling scheme increases with the degree of political freedom 
in an economy, ceteris paribus (H8). 
 
3. Data, methods and results 
To constitute our database (N=116 countries
2), we compiled variables from secondary data 
sources, namely the 2007 Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) (http://www.heritage.org/index/), 
the 2005 Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) (http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/), 
the  Global  Ecolabeling  Network  (GEN)  (http://www.gen.gr.jp/)  and  the  2005  CIA  World 
Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the world factbook/)
3. 
 
3.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable (ECOLABEL) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country has 
adopted  a  governmental  or  quasi governmental  multiproduct  ecolabeling  scheme  and  0 
elsewhere. The presence of an ecolabeling scheme is measured for the year 2006.  
 
3.2 Independent variables 
To test hypotheses H1 to H8 we use several independent variables with a two year lag as 
described in Table I. The variable type, that is, whether the variables are dummy, continuous 
or score variables, their sources and some descriptive statistics are also indicated in Table I. 
Table II provides the Pearson correlation coefficients. 
                                                 
2 The list of countries is available upon request. 
3 These websites have been visited on June, 2007. 4
  Table I: Definition of variables and descriptive statistics (N = 116)  
Descriptive statistics  Hypothesis  Corresponding variable 
and acronym 
Source  Variable type 
Min  Max  Mean  SD 
H1: Richer countries are more likely to adopt an 
ecolabeling scheme, ceteris paribus. 





Continuous  0.15  64.23  10.442  14.749 
H2: Large sized economies are more likely to 
adopt an ecolabeling scheme, ceteris paribus. 
Gross domestic product 
GDP 
CIA    world 
factbook (2005) 
Continuous  11  11750000  335218.5  1393886 
H3: The probability of adopting an ecolabeling 
scheme increases with the degree of economic 
freedom in an economy, ceteris paribus. 




Score  28.4  83  58.9078  10.074 
H4: The probability of adopting an ecolabeling 
scheme increases with the degree of openness of 
an economy, ceteris paribus. 
Export of good and services 




Continuous  11  123  42.2907  21.1366 
H5: The probability of adopting an ecolabeling 
scheme increases for countries having higher 






Score   0.85  6.44  2.5494  1.08356 
H6: The probability of adopting an ecolabeling 
programme increases with a society past 
experience with organisational innovations, 
ceteris paribus. 






Continuous  0  23466  921.534  2795.120 
H7: The probability of adopting an ecolabeling 
programme increases with a society 
involvement in environmental issues, ceteris 
paribus. 






Continuous  0  29  10.974  5.705 
H8: The probability of adopting an ecolabeling 
scheme increases with the degree of political 
freedom in an economy, ceteris paribus. 









3.224  1.819 
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  Table II: Pearson correlation matrix 
  GDP-C  GDP  ECO-
FREEDOM 
EXPORT  MEMB  INNOV  ISO14  POL-
FREEDOM 
GDP-C  1               
GDP  0.232  1             
ECO-FREEDOM  0.643  0.158  1           
EXPORT  0.132   0.217  0.162  1         
MEMB  0.485  0.343  0.275   0.163  1       
INNOV  0.838  0.368  0.636  0.137  0.498  1     
ISO14  0.342  0.565  0.146   0.181  0.391  0.446  1   
POL-FREEDOM   0.565   0.103   0.709  0.014   0.34   0.569   0.209  1 6 
   
3.3 Econometric model 







ji j i u X Y + + = ∑
=
β α    N i 1,2,..., =   (1) 
where  j X  represents the vector of variables for adopting of an ecolabeling scheme;  1 β  to  8 β  
are slope coefficients to be estimated, and α  and µ  are the intercept and the disturbance term, 
respectively. The interpretation of the latent variable in this kind of model is typically that of 
an overall net gain originating from adoption. Of course, the net gain here has to be taken in a 
very broad sense. When this latent variable is positive, adoption gains outweigh losses due to 
the adoption. The model of country adoption of an ecolabeling scheme is stated as a discrete 
choice model, with the dummy variable indicating adoption of an ecolabeling scheme, as the 









  (2) 
We  specified  logistic  distributions  for  µ  and  maximized  the  log likelihood  of  the  logit 
models (Greene, 2003) to estimate models parameters up to a positive constant. 
 
3.4 Results and discussion 
Logit estimation results are presented in Table III, together with goodness of fit measures 
(Maximum Likelihood estimation). Thanks to the model chi square statistic, we can reject the 
null  hypothesis  stating  that  coefficients  for  all  variables  in  the  model  are  zero.  To  better 
interpret the sensitivity of the probability of certification with respect to explanatory variables, 
we  also  report  marginal  effects
4.  The  sensitivity  (proportion  of  observations  correctly 
predicted as 1) and specificity (proportion of observations correctly predicted as 0) statistics 
are acceptable. The Nagelkerke R
2 of 0.83 indicates that the model explains about 83% of                          
the variation in the dependent variable. We are now in a position to test for the validity of 
each hypothesis, based on the statistical significance of associated parameters
5. 
 
The hypothesis that richer countries are more likely to adopt an ecolabeling scheme, ceteris 
paribus (H1) is not supported. A plausible explanation is that richer countries prefer political 
control  of  environmental  decision  making  that  demonstrates  a  higher  commitment  to 
environmental performances rather than a more risky instrument in terms of environmental 
outcomes. The hypothesis that large sized economies are more likely to adopt an ecolabeling 
scheme, ceteris paribus (H2) is also not supported.  
 
The hypothesis that the probability of adopting an ecolabeling scheme depends on the degree 
of economic freedom in an economy, ceteris paribus (H3) is supported by our findings, but 
                                                 
4 For  continuous  explanatory  variables,  marginal  effects  measure  the  change  in  the  estimated  probability 
following an increase of the explanatory variable by 1 unit; for discrete variables however, the marginal effect is 
calculated as the difference between the probabilities estimated at the sample means when the dummy variable 
takes the values 1 and zero respectively. 
5 In order to remedy to potential multicollinearity problems, we can either increase the sample size or use a 
seemingly unrelated regression to eliminate one or several correlated variables. Nevertheless, these strategies are 
not adequate here. Despite some controversial issues regarding the backward stepwise logistic procedure, we 
implemented it. The selected predictors are ECO FREEDOM, INNOV, POL FREEDOM. We also estimated 
several versions of the model (not reported here) showing that our results are robust to the inclusion/exclusion of 
some variables while the model fitness remains good. 7
  Table III : Logit estimates regarding the adoption of an ecolabeling scheme  
Parameter  Estimate  t ratio  Marginal effect 
Intercept  3.6240  0.7834   
GDP C  0.0237  0.459  0.0008451       
GDP   0.000056   1.186   5.57e 08       
ECO FREEDOM   0.147(**)   2.033   0.0052449       
EXPORT   0.0105  0.515   0.0003733       
INNOV  2.9556(**)  2.242  0.1054343       
ISO 14  0.00681(***)  2.885  0.0002428 
MEMB   0.1621   1.281   0.0057827       
POL FREEDOM   0.9344(***)   2.53   0.0333324       
R
2 Nagelkerke                                                                                                               0.846                                                                                                 
Log likelihood                                                                                                              20.384 
Likelihood Ratio Test χ
2(8)                                                                                          112.1943                                                                                      
Correct predictions (per cent)                                                                                       94%                                    
Correct predictions with intercept only                                                                        62.9% 
Sensitivity (proportion of observations correctly predicted as 1)                                88.4%                                
Specificity (proportion of observations correctly predicted as 0)                                97.3% 
Number of observations                                                                                               116                                                                                                









   
*, (**), (***) indicate parameter significance at the 10, (5), (1) per cent level respectively. Marginal effects are computed at the sample mean.8 
   
the sign is negative. A higher degree of economic freedom is likely to decrease the probability 
of adopting a governmental ecolabeling scheme, maybe because private ecolabeling schemes 
are preferred in such contexts. Another explanation may be found in the multidimensional 
nature of the index of economic freedom. Indeed, the index of economic freedom aggregates 
10 specific factors, and average them equally into a total score that may mask the respective 
effects of each dimension
6. The hypothesis that the probability of adopting an ecolabeling 
scheme increases with the degree of openness of an economy, ceteris paribus (H4) is not 
supported. A plausible explanation is that our proxy (EXPORT) does not distinguish between 
export destinations or isolate the kind of exports for which ecolabeling schemes would act as 
a useful signalling or/and screening device. Export markets in eco sensitive countries like 
Germany may have a strong impact (relative to eco insensitive countries) on the decision to 
adopt an ecolabeling scheme. However, if the exporting country is considered as sufficiently 
environmentally friendly, ecolabeling schemes would play a weaker role as a market signal. 
 
The hypothesis that the probability of adopting an ecolabeling scheme increases for countries 
having  higher  technological  innovation  capacities,  ceteris  paribus  (H5)  is  supported. 
Consequently,  countries  with  higher  technological  innovation  capacities  can  consider 
ecolabeling schemes as a way to increase the value of their innovations. The hypothesis that 
the probability of adopting an ecolabeling program increases with previous experience with 
other environmental organizational innovations, ceteris paribus (H6) is supported. Thus, the 
diffusion of different (eco)organizational innovations is somewhat shaped by a kind of ‘path 
dependency’.  
 
The hypothesis related to society involvement in environmental issues (H7) is not supported. 
Countries participation in global environmental governance may be an inadequate proxy of 
society involvement in environmental issues. Moreover, the possible weak overlap between 
issues affected by ecolabeling schemes and global environmental governance can explain this 
finding.  Last,  but  not  least  the  hypothesis  that  the  probability  of  adopting  an  ecolabeling 
scheme increases with the degree of political freedom in an economy, ceteris paribus (H8) is 
supported.  This  result  is  consistent  with  several  studies  (e.g.,  Barrett  and  Graddy,  2000) 
indicating that civil and political liberties can improve various non monetary measures of 
human welfare.  
  
4. Conclusion 
We have presented empirical estimates of the impacts of various determinants on the adoption 
of official ecolabeling schemes among countries. Our findings indicate that economic and 
political freedoms, innovation capacities and experience with other environmental voluntary 
approaches  play  a  major  and  sometimes  counter intuitive  role  to  explain  the  diffusion  of 
governmental ecolabeling programs. The adoption of some policy instruments seems related 
to a set of institutional factors such as political freedom which may serve the implementation 
of  innovative  environmental  policies.  Although  studying  the  determinants  of  the  political 
decision of ecolabeling programmes adoption is important, it does not inform us on the ‘real 
use’ of these schemes by market actors and ultimately on their overall success. Therefore, 
measuring  the  ‘real  implementation’  of  such  programmes  in  terms  of  number  of  product 
categories covered or number of ecolabeled products number can allow to refine our empirical 
analysis. Moreover, considering the adoption of a larger set of ecolabeling schemes  (private  
                                                 
6 Given the number of observations (N=116), we are limited regarding the introduction of each dimension of 
economic  freedom that  may  allow  to disentangle their respective effects on the adoption of an ecolabeling 
scheme.  9 
   
and/or sector specific ecolabeling schemes ecolabels) can improve our understanding of the 
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